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Thatcher’s	Britain:	A	New	Take	on	an	Old	Illusion	
	
Abstract	
The	Thatcher	Illusion	is	generally	discussed	as	a	phenomenon	related	to	face	
perception.		Nonetheless,	we	show	that	compellingly	strong	Thatcher	Effects	can	
be	elicited	with	non‐face	stimuli,	provided	that	the	stimulus	set	has	a	familiar	
standard	configuration	and	a	canonical	view.		Apparently,	the	Thatcher	Illusion	is	
not	about	faces,	nor	is	it	about	Thatcher.		It	just	might,	however,	be	about	Britain.	
	
In	1980	Peter	Thompson	turned	the	world	of	face	perception	on	its	head	
by	introducing	the	“Thatcher	Illusion”	(Thompson,	1980).		The	process	of	what	is	
now	commonly	referred	to	as	“Thatcherization”	consists	of	inverting	the	mouth	
and	eyes	of	the	image	of	a	face,	whilst	maintaining	their	normal	location	in	the	
global	configuration	of	the	face.	The	resultant	images,	when	presented	upright	
are	immediately	perceived	as	“wrong”	or	even	“grotesque”.		However,	when	they	
are	presented	upside	down	it	is	exceptionally	difficult	to	distinguish	them	from	
inverted	normal	faces,	even	when	they	are	presented	with	such	side‐by‐side.	
This	phenomenon	is	lovingly	known	as	the	“Thatcher	Effect”	(TE).	The	illusion	
has	served	as	a	valuable	experimental	tool	to	address	varied	questions	relating	
to	mechanisms	of	face	perception	(e.g.,	Talati	et	al.,	2010);	neural	characteristics	
of	such	mechanisms	(e.g.,	Psalta	et	al.,	2014);	clinical	deficits	in	face	processing	
(e.g.,	Joshua	&	Rossell,	2009;	Rouse	et	al.,	2004);	other‐race	effects	(Hahn	et	al.,	
2012);	emotion	perception	(e.g.,	Muskat	&	Sjoberg,	1997);	and	face	perception	in	
non‐human	primates	(Weldon	et	al.,	2013).	
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Numerous	explanations	have	been	proposed	to	account	for	TEs;	many	of	
which	centre	on	the	idea	that	inversion	disrupts	hard‐wired	mechanisms	for	
holistic	face	processing	(e.g.,	Bartlett	&	Searcy,	1993).		Other	explanations	
implicate	the	interplay	of	distinct	processes	for	local	and	global	processing	of	
facial	features	(e.g.,	Carbon	et	al.,	2005).	A	more	recent	suggestion	is	that	the	
illusion	is	partially	explained	by	implicit	“shape‐from‐shading”	assumptions	
predicated	upon	an	overhead	source	of	illumination	(Talati	et	al.,	2010).		
Such	explanations	are	generally	couched	in	terms	of	face	specific	
processes.		Attempts	to	“Thatcherize”	other	types	of	stimuli	including	houses	
(e.g.,	Rouse	et	al.,	2004)	and	bikini‐clad	models	(Anstis,	2009)	have	enjoyed	only	
limited	success.		Where	evidence	exists	for	non‐face	stimuli	eliciting	the	TE,	the	
effect	is	demonstrably	weaker	compared	to	those	elicited	by	faces	(e.g.,	Wong	et	
al.,	2010).		
Here	we	argue	that	the	apparent	weakness	of	non‐face	TEs	may	rest	upon	
the	choice	of	stimulus	materials.		Unlike	non‐face	stimuli	sets	used	to	date,	faces	
have	both	1)	a	standard	spatial	configuration	of	features;	and	2)	a	canonical	
viewpoint.		A	full	frontal	upright	depiction	of	a	face	may	be	considered		
“canonical”	(e.g.	when	we	converse	with	another	individual	we	generally	present	
face‐on;	when	a	child	draws	a	face	it	is	most	commonly	face‐on).		But,	non‐face	
stimuli	often	lack	one	or	both	of	these	attributes.		Consider	bikini	models:	they	
possess	a	(reasonably)	standard	configuration	of	features,	but	there	is	no	single	
canonical	viewpoint	for	models	(who	may	be	depicted	in	various	poses).		
Conversely,	although	houses	enjoy	a	“canonical”	view	(they	are	typically	viewed	
frontally	and	upright),	they	are	not	really	defined	by	a	“standard”	configuration.		
Moreover,	to	the	extent	that	there	does	exist	an	“iconic”	house	structure,	it	could	
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be	argued	that	this	results	in	a	somewhat	face‐like	appearance	(Figure	1)	thus	
obviating	their	utility	as	“non‐face”	stimuli.		
	
Fig	1.	House	and	Face,	or	Face	and	House?	
	
We	reasoned	that	clear	TEs	would	be	producible	using	stimulus	types	for	
which	there	is	both	a	standard	configuration	(including	substructural	elements)	
and	a	canonical	viewpoint.	Fortunately,	satisfying	such	desiderata	are	
Macroscale	Geographical	Entities	(MaGgiEs)	such	as	the	British	Isles.		MaGgiEs,	
being	singular,	have	a	“standard	configuration”,	but	are	subject	to	a	proliferation	
of	schematic	and	photographic	exemplar	images.	Moreover,	the	cartographic	
convention	of	representing	such	entities	on	a	Euclidean	plane	oriented	
North(top)‐to‐South(bottom)	furnishes	us	with	a	canonical	viewpoint.		
Using	Adobe	Photoshop,	we	manipulated	freeware	satellite	images	of	the	
British	Isles	by	rotating	Ireland	around	its	horizontal	or	vertical	axis.		Four	image	
pairs	(each	consisting	of	one	manipulated	and	one	unmanipulated	MaGgiE)	were	
created;	two	with	a	non‐canonical	(north‐down)	view	(Figure	2)	and	two	with	
the	canonical	view	(Figure	3).	Each	pair	was	displayed	to	a	lecture	hall	seating	
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approximately	100	undergraduate	students.	Using	handheld	wireless	‘clickers’,	
their	task	was	to	indicate	(as	quickly	as	possible)	which	image	in	each	pair	
accurately	depicted	the	British	Isles.	Responses	that	took	longer	than	5	seconds	
were	discounted.	(These	experimental	procedures	were	approved	by	the	
Department	of	Psychology	Ethics	Committee	at	University	of	York).	
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Pooling	data	from	the	horizontal	and	vertical	manipulations	gave	us	84	
upright	and	70	inverted	responses.	Participants	were	near	ceiling	for	upright	
images	(94%	correct)—indicating	that	they	readily	identified	the	manipulated	
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map	in	its	canonical	view.	However,	this	ability	was	lost	when	the	map	was	
rotated,	as	the	non‐canonical	view	elicited	near	chance	performance	(43%	
correct).		
We	conclude	that	Britain’s	MaGgiE	may	be	as	effective	at	eliciting	the	TE	
as	its	namesake	ex‐prime	minister.	And,	just	as	the	TE	has	been	shown	to	work	
with	non‐Thatcher	faces,	we	expect	it	may	be	so	for	other	MaGgiEs	that	share	
these	common	features.		Indeed,	the	Thatcher	illusion	appears	to	have	little	to	do	
with	Thatcher	or	faces,	but	is	likely	to	result	from	any	stimulus	for	which	there	is	
both	a	canonical	view	and	a	sufficiently	familiar	standard	configuration	of	
features.		Well,	either	that,	or	the	illusion	is	really	all	about	Britain.	
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